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I N D E X
Of
WITNESSES
(none)
- - -
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo,
Japan
The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930.
- - -
Appearances:
For the Tribunal, same as before.
For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
For the Defense Section, same as before with the exception that NISHI, Haruhiko, is now Chief Japanese Defense Counsel and Dr. HOZUMI, Shigetaka, has become Associate Counsel for the Accused TOGO, Shigenori.
- - -
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.
Dr. UZAWA.
Mr. President, with the Court's permission, I should like to report that yesterday Mr. NISHI, Haruhiko, became defense counsel for the defendant, TOGO, and Dr. HOZUMI, who had hitherto been chief counsel for the same defendant has become associate counsel.
Mr. McKinney.
I offer in evidence prosecution's document 4026-A, a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, for the purpose of showing Germany's interest in a change of the Japanese Cabinet.
4026-B.
It is B.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Your document 4026-A and also your document 4027-A, which were respectively marked exhibit 515 and exhibit 516, were offered and received into evidence yesterday afternoon.
I present, then, 4026-B from that excerpt.
Prosecution's document
Prosecution's document 4026-B will receive exhibit No. 517.
I would now like to read into evidence certain excerpts from this document, beginning with the heading or caption and two other excerpts.
That expression, "read into the evidence," may be misleading to the defense.
Well, I desire to read --
I think I had better explain this, after a consultation I had with my colleague from India this morning. What you refer to as "the record here" is really only a transcript of the shorthand notes of the proceedings in this court. That is itself only a part of the record. The record comprises the documents as well as the transcript. So, when you read evidence from a document, it appears twice in the record: it appears in the document itself, and it appears in the transcript.
The Court may consider the whole of the evidence in a
document although only a part is read. If there is evidence in a document
which is not read
That may make matters clear to Mr. Smith, among others.
Yes, Mr. McKinney.
Berlin, May 1940
German Embassy, Tokyo
Telegram in Code
(Secret Cipher Process)
For Ambassador Ott in answer to telegram No, 450, The following is to be immediately established concerning the declaration of the Japanese Foreign Minister ARITA:
3). Meanwhile the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin had been in the Foreign Office and has explained that he was called upon by his Government to have a conversation in the Foreign Office on the question of the Netherlands Indies; and in the course of the conversation, which he described as unofficial, he expressed to the State Secretary that his Government would welcome a German declaration on the question.
Last paragraph, next.
I ask you to give these explanations verbally to the Japanese Foreign Minister. A detailed public announcement is out of place, but with respect to the recent inquiries in the press conference, there is no objection to the Japanese arriving at the certainty that Germany had declared her disinterestedness in the Netherlands Indies Question.
Signed
Ribbentrop
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4026-C will receive exhibit No. 518.
TOKYO? 22 May 1940,
Received: 22 May 1940,
No. 474 of 22.5
Re telegram No. 412 (held by Reich Foreign Minister) of 20 May.
Today I have informed, the Japanese Foreign Minister of the operative effect of the latest German victories, and in passing, made the previously written explanations contained in the telegram release, concerning the German attitude to the Netherlands Indies. The Foreign Minister requested me to convey his gratitude to the Reich government for this declaration. The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry issued during today's press conference, a communique according to which Germany has declaredher disinterestedness in the Netherlands East Indies problem.
Signed
OTT
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4026-D will receive exhibit No. 519.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
TOKYO: 23 May 1940.
Received: 23 May 1940.
No. 479 of 23.5 Supplement to Telegram No, 474 of 22 May.
All the press has given great publicity to yesterday's communique from the spokesmen of the Foreign Office on the declaration of German disinterestedness in the Netherlands East Indies question. The papers emphasize consistently that the German attitude is entirely different to the declarations of England, France and Holland, who had given their assent to the Japanese government's viewpoint on the protection of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. In contrast to this, German disinterestednessis considered as a sort of carte blanche for Japan. Germany has thereby stated that she will also support Japan in the future.
Signed, German Ambassador.
Prosecution's document 4025-A is presented for introduction. It is a report from the German Ambassador in Tokyo of confidential information from the Japanese Foreign Minister, relating to Japan's desire for a free hand in Indo-China and the prospects for replacement of the Cabinet for one closer to Germany.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4025-A will receive exhibit No. 520.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo, 19 June 1940 - Arrival 19 June 1940.
To be kept in locked file.
Item. 1, No. 594 of June 19,Very Urgent!
Secret. To: Reichs Chancellery.
The head of the European Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry declared confidentially that the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin had received thedirection today to express congratulations to the Japanese government to the Reich government to the German success and to point out at this opportunity Japan's special interest in the future fate of French Indo-China. The Ambassador is to reiterate Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict, and at the same time stress the fact that Japan believes she has rendered Germany essential services in the European war by tying down American forces in the Pacific Ocean. The Ambassador is instructed to suggest that the German government make some friendly gesture on the subject of Indo-China in appreciation of Japan's attitude. Asked what such a gesture might be the confidant said the Foreign Ministry is thinking of a German declaration according to which Japan would receive a free hand in Indo-China. According to newspapers, the Japanese Ambassador had received identical instructions.
Since, as a result of the collapse of France, the pressure of the activistic public opinion on the cabinet became increasingly stronger, the Foreign Minister evidently decided on this step, in order to save his policy and to keep the cabinet from the otherwise inevitable collapse. There is no doubt about the existence of the danger that the ForeignMinister would make tactical use of possible German blanc authorization concerning Indo-China in his attempt to bring about a compromise with America. Characteristic for the basically unchanged attitude of the Foreign Minister is the elsewhere reported fact, that he concluded friendly agreement on (one group of letters garbled) . . . at the same day with France and England in Tientsin. As viewed from Tokyo, a strengthening of the Japanese position of power in East Asia through annexation of Indo-China would, in itself, be doubtlessly in German interest. In this way the chances for an early end of the China conflict would be increased on the one hand, and on the other hand, the differences between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers would be intensified to such an extent that the danger of an agreement would be eliminated for a long time. If, therefore, a consideration of the Japanese request should be intended, a formula would have to be found which would fix Japan's course definitely along the German lines. This could, first of all, be achieved if Japan would have to obligate herself to the immediate occupation of Indo-China. In this connection, I was confidentially told by army circles that there the idea of occupying the strategically important Yun-ann railway is being propagated. If the government should evade a correspondingly formulated offer for leaving Indochina to them, one would have to calculate at least with a severe blow to their position in case this were published and probably with replacement by a cabinet which would be close to us.
Signed, German Ambassador.
Mr. President, I would like to point out to the Tribunal
that in the opening statement here there was a reference to the Minister of
Overseas Affairs, General KOISO, as Minister of Overseas Affairs, in
relation to this Indo-China matter; and I think it must have been an error.
Either it must have been an error in reference to this matter, which is
apparent from this paper -- it talks of the Foreign Ministry -- because the
duties, as I have inquired into, of Minister of Overseas Affairs have
nothing to do with matters of this nature. I thought it would be wise to
call it to the Court's attention. The prosecution might be able to explain
it later, or it may be that there was an error regarding what the duties of
Minister of Overseas Affairs was by the German Ambassador also. I am not
sure. We will try to clear this up further, but it has been troubling me;
and, since I saw this reference here in this matter to the
Mr. McKinney.
The proper document will show the facts when it is introduced, we take it.
I offer prosecution's document 4025-B in evidence. It is a memorandum from Wiehl to the German State Secretary regarding Indo-China.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No, 4025-B will receive exhibit No. 521.
"NOTE TO TELEGRAM NO. 594, OF JUNE 19
FROM TOKYO RE: INDO-CHINA
Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict have come pretty late; the sacrifices which we in fact made for Japan (stoppage of sending war supplies to China and consequently sacrifice of supply of important Chinese raw material) have as yet received no recognition from the Japanese, let alone economic compensation. Japan's desire for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat strange in view of the attitude Japan has taken re economic relationswith Germany during the war.
If this is to be used in countering the Japanese Ambassador in the forthcoming conversations, the following examples can be introduced:
(1) From the first, Japanese shipping has completely subscribed to the French and English blockade.
(2) For a long time the Japanese Government had not met German wishes for transit of goods through Japan and had only in the dark shown in recent months some obligingness. Thus an assignment of wolfram from Canton and an assignment of tin from Columbia was sent on to Germany. Recently, the Japanese Government even offered us 100 tons each of wolfram and tin from its own stocks to be delivered without cost. However, there are still unfilled requests -- e.g. increasing the Japanese shipping service to Vladivostock which is only made the port of call three tines a month by one Japanese steamer. Also, further shipment of tin from Columbia has not been possible up till now because of the refusal of the Japanese shipping company.
(3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a monopoly agreement with Manchuria for the supply of soya-beans without telling us anythingalthough we had been the biggest customers up till then, e.g. 800,000 tons in 1938. After our remonstration, Japan has up till now only released 70,000 tons to be supplied to us from Manchuria.
(4) Japan still refuses to transport home in small groups from America the crew of the Colombus, nearly 500 men, because she regards them as combatants, following the English interpretation, although in the American interpretation they are styled as shipwrecked survivors.
(5) It is true that Japan sullied us all the whale oil from the last haul of 75,000 tons. However, we know from confidential sources that it first offered half of this to England, and only decided to supply it to us, when it had received no satisfactory English offer.
Hereby submitted to the State Secretary.
Berlin, 20 June 1940.
/s/ WIEHL.
Who is Wiehl?
He is a member of the Economic Division of the Foreign
Ministry -- German Foreign
Have you any evidence of that, any document?
There has none been introduced to that effect as yet.
I tender prosecution's document 4027B. It relates to a conversation in which the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, KURUSU, renewed negotiations for closer Japanese-German relations.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4027B will receive exhibit No. 522.
Memorandum. L. R. Knoll.
On 19 June the Japanese Ambassadors drew me into a conversation regarding the future of German-Japanese relations. He began by referring to the expected visit of the former Foreign Minister Naotake SATO and seemed to want to make suggestions for the subject of the conversation with Mr. SATO. The Ambassador did not touch actual questions of German and Japanese policy.
The Ambassador stated somewhat as follows: 'The knowledge that Japan's welfare depends not on the Western Powers, but that an approach to Germany is of significance to Japan, broke through even in circles which till then had been strangers to Germany. Oneindication for this is SATO's wish to come to Germany now. I am glad that he thus takes the opportunity to get to know the new Germany from close by and I am sure that his visit will be further material in the process of winning over the circles which up to now had no interest in Germany to the idea of an approach to Germany. Today the building up of heavy industry is regarded as the most important task in Japan. The light industry is ready for the greater part; where this is not the case its further development is of no considerable political importance and can be put aside. If, in the field of development of heavy industry, a close cooperation between Japan and Germany is possible, which I do not doubt, Japan will gain freedom of action towards the United States. The question of raw material supplies from England and America I do not regard as so dangerous. The raw material countries are under export pressure, especially if England should now blockade Europe. Therefore we need not fear the boycott warnings. But if our economic circles see Germany's great industrial development and realize that Germany is not only not behind the United States, but has overtaken her in many fields, they will, in view of the unfriendly attitude of the United States, gladly switch over to Germany. The improvement of Japanese-Russian relations is, as long as the present war lasts,a pre-requisite for this switching. TOGO and I are feverishly working for it, and it becomes more and more clear in Japan that the future of Japan lies in the South, and that the enemy in the North must be made a friend. Certain military circles are opposed to such a turn, but there too OSHIMA will have acted for their enlightenment in the meantime.
After the war the German-Italian, Russian, Japanese-Chinese and American blocks will remain. It is important for Japan as well as for Germany that close relations between Japan and Germany will then remain or be established. I see the way to that in the first place in the economic field mentioned before. Germany should consign to the Japanese block an ample position in her post war economic program.
Ambassadore SATO could be told, in case the conversation with him is held on this or similar lines, that the contribution, which is expected of Japan, is to show a more obliging attitude concerning Germany's wants for raw materials in Japanese (oil sources) and overseas areas. Especially the argument of the export pressure on the raw material countries points against the reserve in transit questions which Japan showed until now. Japan should not fear boycott warnings or bringforth this fear as an excuse in regard to allowing transit businesses for Germany.
A promise of delivery for the expansion of Heavy industry after the war would today when Japan believes in Germany's victory, very probably lead to considerable giving-in in the bean (Manchukuo) and transit questions.
Berlin, 20 June 1940.
(Signed) KNOLL.
We will show that Knoll was a member of the German Foreign Ministry.
You had better explain Wiehl's position too, and the position of all the others who wrote memoranda or otherwise signed communications.
Yes, sir. We will do that with Wiehl and Knoll.
Mr. McManus.
Mr. President, I know that several weeks ago former
ambassador from Germany was present here in Tokyo, Mr. Ott. In fact, I
personally met him, I would like to ascertain at this time whether or not
the prosecution intends to call Mr. Ott as a witness. If not, I don't think
it should be en cumbant upon the defense to call him, seeing that these
documents signed by him are being introduced by the prosecution. I think we
should have an opportunity of cross-examining Mr. Ott concerning some of the
Well, if the Court, after full consideration of the material attributed to Ott, come to the conclusion he ought to be called for cross-examination, they probably will direct that he be called, but I haven't had an opportunity of consulting the Members about that, point, Mr. McManus. But they will all have it well in mind now. This is evidence not volunteered by Ott but documents taken from the Japanese Foreign Office, or other Japanese sources, and that may make a difference. I should say the German Foreign office.
Mr. McKinney.
I present prosecution document 4025C for introduction. It is a telegram from the German Ambassadore in Toky and concerns Japanese efforts, through the accused MUTO and KOISO, to obtain Germany's views concerning military aggression in Indo-China.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4025C will be given exhibit No. 523.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process). To be kept in locked file.
Tokyo 24 June 1940.
Arrival 25 June 1940.
No. 614 of 24 June.
I.) The head of the Central Division of the War Ministry, General MUTO has informed the Military Attache that the Japanese Army would welcome it, if Germany were prepared, if need be, to act as mediator in the already extended conciliatory talks between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, in order to conclude the China conflict in a way acceptable to Japan. The General declared further that Japan is very much interested in Indo-China also for this reason. The Military Attache promised to forward this, and broached the question of Russia's attitude to such a development. The General replied that the Japanese Army considered conciliation with Russia to be necessary. General MUTO's inquiry is to be taken as the official proposal of the Army, according to Japanese custom.
II.) The Minister of Overseas Affairs, General KOISO, asked me in a conversation to which he had invited me, what Germany's attitude would be to themilitary activity of Japan in Indo-China and in parts of the Netherlands Indies. I pointed to the well-known declaration of the Reich Government, according to which Germany is not interested in the question of the Netherlands Indies and added that we would probably raise no objections to Japanese action in Indo-China, provided that Japan obliges herself to tie down America in the Pacific area, perhaps by a promise to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of Americas entry into the war against Germany. The Minister of Overseas Affairs replied that he would be pleased to pursue this idea further. Regarding a possible Japanese Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, the Minister thought that for this Russia would probably ask for certain territorial concessions in a northwestern province of China and Outer-Mongolia, which could be discussed. The Minister admitted that an agreement with Russia and the realization of Japanese colonial wishes in Indo-China and in the Netherlands Indies would not only gradually make Japan economically independent of America, but would offer to the expected KONOYE t Government a promising starting point for an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. I have the impression that the ambitious Minister of Overseas Affairs wanted to qualify himself for the next cabinet by putting out these feelers.
III.) Also Ambassador SHIRATORI, who is ever more frequently named as the coming Foreign Minister, advocated a Non-Aggression Pact with Russia in an interview yesterday with the YOMIURI.
IV.) Today's resignation of Prince KONOYE as President of the Privy Council indicates continuing internal political developments with the aim of formation of the new Government and a new unity party under KONOYE. Since leading personalities of the KONOYE circle are obviously trying to make contact with me, I ask for authorization to discuss with them confidentially the ideas of MUTO and KOISO, in order to establish what power is standing behind them and what possibilities result therefrom. My impression up to now that the possibility of the formation of a Pacific bloc of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek China and Russia in association with Germany, which ties down America in the Pacific sphere and could cripple her freedom of action vis-a-vis Europe is becoming prominent.
(Signed)
OTT.
The Tribunal's attention is directed to the fact that the
Chief Interpreter of the German Foreign Office made a record of certain
conversations between German and Japanese representatives, which
conversations are contained in documents to be presented in evidence. Where
this is the situation, Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
I now offer in evidence prosecution's document 1397, to which is attached a Schmidt affidavit. The document is a memorandum of a conversation with German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in which the Japanese Ambassador SATO renewed Japanese efforts for closer Japanese-German relations.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1379 will receive exhibit No. 524.
MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATA, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAHMER, 8 July 1940.
After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very closecooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.
As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.
About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity oftheir cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.
In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has "become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.
The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her right for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. Thenatural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.
Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.
As a result of Germany's Victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.
Ambassador SATO replied that it wascomprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression, in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.
In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.
To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICE as to what in reality then was the basicreason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia."
Berlin, 9 July 1940. Signed SCHMIDT.
I will now read the affidavit mentioned on the introduction.
Is there any real need for this? The defense are not asking for it, are they?.
Sir?
Is there any real need for this? I can understand the general affidavit read the other day.
All right, sir, unless the Court wants it in the record -- written in the record -- why, I will not read it.
If the Tribunal please, since the affidavit will not be
read, I merely wish
Well, if the prosecution accepts Mr. Cunningham's statement, we have now a note on the record, or in the transcript, of the position, and it will not be necessary to read the affidavit. The Members may refer to the affidavit themselves if they see fit.
All right, sir.
Prosecution documents 1590 D and 1590 B are tendered in evidence; the former is a message from Foreign Minister ARITA to Ambassador SATO in which concern was expressed regarding Germany's ambition in the South Seas, and the latter is Ambassador SATO's reply.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document 1590 D will receive exhibit No. 525, and document No. 1590 B will receive exhibit No. 526.
Exhibit 25 we will read first, 525 it is.
General Telegram No. 23144. To Special Envoy SATO, c/o Ambassador KURUSU, Berlin, Germany. From Foreign Minister ARITA.
Matter concerning Japanese -German Concert No. 445 (Urgent, Secret Code)
Referring to your cablegram No. 870
(1) Your conversation with the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop seems to have brought out clearly the spirit of German victory. You have informed me thatRibbentrop showed you a 'non-commital' attitude concerning Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Perhaps, he had no concern with these problems. But did you not disconcern his air to persue something from Japan by utilizing Japan - for example, Japan's participation in European war?
You stated that he predicted the world would be divided into four Economic Blocks in the future. But, did you not receive the impression that Germany would not recognize the superiority of a certain stabilizing power in each Block indirectly, but has begun to hope for domination by Germany of the French and Dutch colonies in East Asia also?
(2) While Ribbentrop expressed his optimistic opinion on the subject of Japanese-American relation, you spoke of the tendency of deterioration of Japanese-American relation and you hinted that, if war should come to exist between the two countries it would cause Germany an unfavorable reflection upon her European policy. Did you intend t o call his attention by saying so, in the sense that the war with the U.S.A. would inevitably cause Japan to march on to the South Seas and thus bring out difficulties in accomplishing German object? Or, did you intend to warn him that the war with U.S.A. would have an unfavorable effecton the German war situation in Europe as a result of Japan's consumption of national strength and weaken the pressure on the USSR? Furthermore, did you go so far as to say in your conversation with Ribbentrop that the Japanese-American War, if it occurred, would develop into a German-American war? Please reply immediately.
Berlin, July 15, 1940. To Foreign Minister ARITA. From Ambassador KURUSU. No. 901 (Secret Code). Referring to your telegram No. 445. Ambassador SATO answered.
(1) It may not necessarily be that Germany does not embrace at all a hidden intention to utilize as tactics her noncommittal attitude to the Japan's demand in relation to Dutch Indies, etc., but, judging from the RIBBENTROP's attitude, at least, I did not find such an air to request Japan's participation in the war making a good use of it as a bait. I felt, rather, that Germany did not attach importance to Japan's national power at present, excepting her naval power. I cannot, also, say so far that Germany has already fostered an ambition on the southern colonies. Comparing with the days I sent telegram No. 527, today when Germany won the great victory in European continent, it must not be passed over that pretty large change arose in thought of Germany.
(2) What I said concerning the problem towards America was not intended to restrain Germany's ambition on the South Seas, nor intended to mean what was related to the consummation of the Japanese national power and decrease of Japan's pressure on theUSSR. As seen in my telegram No. 870 and its supplementary one, I made RIBBENTROP pay attention, suggesting the possible development of the U, S.-Japanese war to the U. S.-German war. I talked him those, a little in a threatening way, supposing the participation of the U. S. in the war against Germany might be the great pain to her while she was engaging in the operations to Britain devotedly and she was endeavoring to avoid the long war. I guessed what he felt then was just this very weak point. However, I avoided to utter such a direct narration as to say it would develop to Japanese-American war, but used the expression as seen in my telegram.
You used the expression ". . . consummation of the Japanese national power." Consumption is clearly wrong.
Yes, sir, it is in the English.
What is right? Consumption or consummation?
The correct word is consumption.
Mr. Tavenner.
I now desire to introduce in evidence prosecution document
1308, for the purpose of showing the existence of a strong Japanese demand
for conclusion of a military alliance between Japan, Germany,
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1308 will receive exhibit No. 527.
Minutes of the Joint Conference of War, Navy, and Foreign Ministries on Strengthening of Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.
12 July 1940. Those present: War Ministry, Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA; Navy Ministry, Commander SHIBA; Naval General Staff, Captain ONO; Foreign Ministry, Section Chief ANDO, Section Chief ISHIZAWA, Secretary TOKUNAGA.
ANDO:The Foreign Office gave instructions to Ambassador SATO some time ago to confer with German authorities upon strengthening the coalition between the two countries, and. Mr. SATO was able to exchange views with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. At that conference, RIBBENTROP said that he could not understand in the least what Japan was after. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to draw and present to him a more concrete and further penetrated draft and thereby intensifythe coalition between Japan and Germany. The draft distributed among you is only a tentative plan made by our Foreign Office, but I want you to discuss it and let me hear your opinions.
(Upon request of Lieutenant Colonel TAKAYAMA, he explains the substance of the draft.)
ANDO: This draft has been drawn with the aim of intensifying the coalition of Japan and Germany upon supposition that Germany will conquer England, have the hegemony of Europe and Africa, and establish New Order there. Regarding our Soviet policy, which is an important problem to us, we want to check Soviet through the influence of Japanese-German coalition. There is a probability of the formation of a U. S.-Soviet coalition, but we hope to check this likewise by Japanese-German coalition. As to the limit of Japanese-German coalition, it is deemed wise for us to avoid to participate in the European War, as is shown in the draft and in view of our present domestic and economic conditions as well as our relations with Soviet and the United States. (We have asked the opinions of the Army and the Navy on this subject, and they both have expressed approval.) Our plan is to join hands with Germany to the fullest extent but within the scope of being driven into the war.
TAKAYAMA:Is this plan merely to have thethree ministries come to an agreement and to submit their opinions to the higher authorities for discussion?
We will recess now for fifteen minutes.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
Mr. Tavenner,
MR. TAVENNER:
ANDO:As this matter needs to be carried out promptly, I want to submit it to the higher authorities and have them put into practice as our national policy as soon as the three ministries arrive at an agreement.
(The Army and the Navy gave consent to his proposal, and ANDO goes into explanation of the substance.)
ANDO: A plan has been proposed some time ago to the effect that Japan should have Germany recognize its free hand concerning French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Sea Islands. But as the meaning of free hand is somewhat vague, if it is expressed more definitely, it will be as drafted. I should like to hear your opinion on this point. The object of this draft is to have Germany understand that Japan has no territorial ambition over these spheres, but Japan wants to firmly establish not only the freedom of economic activities but also political leadership. In order to have this approved by Germany, it will be necessary to choose a form easy for Germanyto approve.
TAKAYAMA:You say you want to make Germany recognize Japan's political leadership in the South Seas, but, what relation does it have with Japan's political leadership in China and Manchuria?
ANDO: As I regard our political leadership in China and Manchuria as a matter of course, I did not enumerate it here.
ANDO: Concerning British, French and Dutch territories, we will discuss the details later.
ANDO: Concerning German support to the settlement of the Chinese Incident, our attitude should be absolutely independent. For instance, concerning such matters as German mediation of the Chinese Incident which has recently almost come into question, we should have Germany mediate from a point of view that as a part of the general problem of Japan-German coalition, the quick settlement of the Incident and the solidifying of Japan's position will become a favorable factor to Germany. We should avoid assuming a supplicatory attitude. It is also necessary to study concretely the recognition of the new regime and the prohibition of exports to CHIANG.
ANDO: The question of trade with Europeand Africa and on other economic matters has been raised, because, if Germany should resort to a closed economy in case of forming a block economy in Europe and Africa, Japan would fall into difficulties. To meet this problem we hope to maintain trade between the East Asia and South Seas economic sphere of Japan and the new economic sphere of Germany, and to make clear whether or not other economic relations should exist, as well as the difference /of Japan and Germany's position in the two spheres/.
ANDO: The most important problem among Japan's promises to Germany will be the restraint of British activities in East Asia as much as possible in order to facilitate Germany's conquest of England (refer to Article (2)), and on this point I should like to request the Army and the Navy to study what practical measures exist. As far as I am concerned, oppression of British political rights and interests in East Asia or a secret assistance to the native independence movements in India and Burma, in accordance with the changes in the situation, may serve as restraining measures.
ANDO: Point 3 specifies compensation for Germany's recognition of our political predominance in the South Sea Islands. Germany craves for Wolframrubber, and tin from China and the South Seas, and we will supply Germany with them. We will also give favorable consideration to Germany's economic activities (including investment and enterprises) in China and the South Seas. (a) and (b) will keep an even balance.
ONO: After the conclusion of the war there may be occasions when Germany might carry out active economic operations towards the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and China, and especially after Germany makes France and the Netherlands somewhat like subject states, it is probable that she will dispatch active members of the Nazi Party to French Indo-China and the Dutch Fast Indies and keep these two colonies under her political leadership even if she would not go so far as to make them her own territories. Therefore, Japan's policy toward French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies must be hastened in order to prevent such movement /on the part of Germany/ and she must also endeavour to sever French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies from European influence as soon as possible.
ANDO: As to our Soviet policy referred to in (2), it is equally favorable to both Japan and Germany to maintain peace with the Soviet Unionat present. However, we cannot forecast to what direction Germany will turn its relations with Soviet after cessation of the European War. It will he necessary for us to make some sort of arrangement with Germany beforehand as Japan and Germany will he in the same position in their relations with Soviet. However, the relation between Germany and Soviet at the present moment is delicate, and there probably may be something which Germany cannot tell us unreservedly. For this reason, the latter part of article (2) may be dropped according to circumstances.
TAKAYAMA: Germany would not like to see Soviet penetrate into Rumania. Should Germany request us to check Soviet in the East, what measures could be considered?
Concerning the above measures, discussions followed. Then, the subject was turned to Japan's U.S. policy, Article (3) of Chapter II.
TAKAYAMA: Does this mean that Japan will not try to reach any particular understanding with the United States after all? For example, if such an agreement as to guarantee the peace of the Pacific should be reached, and if the United States should, as a consequence, no longer sense menace in the Pacific, it may interfere with European affairs, whichGermany will no doubt detest.
ANDO: No! Even if such an agreement should be reached, the agreement will be made in a manner that the United States will confine itself to the American continents and it will not interfere with the affairs of the South Seas and other parts of the world. Recently, Hitler propounded that the United States should mind its own business of the American continents and should not interfere with the affairs of other continents, and RIBBENTROP, in his conversation with our Ambassador SATO, did not seem to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation to restrain the United States, Apparently, Germany's wish is to maintain a peaceful relation with the United States at present and in the future, as long as the latter does not take an offensive attitude. Consequently, Germany is not likely to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation.
TAKAYAMA: Will not Germany demand us to take some measures in order to prevent the United States from participating in the war on Britain's side?
ANDO:Such anxiety was felt in the early stage of the present War, but we have practically no such uneasiness now, for Germany does not anticipate the United States' participation in the war any longer.
ISHIZAWA:There is one thing that we should keep in our mind in respect of our relation with the United States. After two to throe years from now, the U.S. Navy will become a far greater power. Japan and Germany must necessarily check it together.
ANDO:Both Japan and Germany should not positively be antagonistic to the United States, but should restrain it peaceably.
ISHIZAWA:Judging from each assertion made by Japan and the United States, there is a considerable difference in opinions between the two, and it will require unusual efforts to adjust it. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the New Order in Europe, the United States will find it difficult to interfere in European affairs, and as a consequence, it will intervene in Far Eastern affairs, with the Philippines and Hawaii as its naval bases. Should a peaceful order be established between Japan and the United States,the latter may insist upon pretty severe conditions to be accepted by Japan. And if we try to make Germany restrain the United States, we may turn out to be a liability to Germany.
ANDO: However, should the United States put pressure upon Japan, Japan's power of restraining Soviet may be weakened, and Germany would not like it. So Japan's relations with the United States and Soviet and that of Germany will eventually become the same.
TAKAYAMA: Germany has considerably advanced into South America since pre-war time, and won't it be as absolutely necessary for Germany to advance to South America after the war as well? If so, the United States would not approve of this movement and don't you think a conflict will arise between Germany and the United States?
Discussions followed.
SHIBA: According to Helfrich who recently visited Japan, it was said that, contrary to Japan's erroneous assumption, German's industrial power which had expanded during and before the war would undertake great economic activities in order to extend the market for German industrial products in post-war time. It is certain thatGermany will penetrate economically into China and the South Seas also.
ANDO: Concerning article (4) of Chapter II, as it was decided, we cannot accept a request to join the war, even if Germany should make such a request to us.
ANDO: Concerning Chapter III, which is the coalition between Japan and Italy, Italy has hitherto reiterated that it would support Japan in her East Asiatic policy. It would be also important that we maintain a friendly relation with Italy to restrain Germany which would pride itself upon its victory. I think it will be an adequate measure to present our coalition proposal to Italy at the same time we do to Germany.
The Army and Navy approved his suggestion.
Then someone asked, One of the most important matters for Japan in connection with Italy is Italy's relation with Soviet. But, is Italy willing to maintain peace with Soviet?
TAKAYAMA: As long as the present European War is in progress, Germany and Ital's policy toward Soviet will be more or less the same.
After there were some arguments about the formality of the agreement, it was decided thatthe agreement be written in the form of a diplomatic note, unless the other government is anxious to have it written in the form of a regular pact, as it would take a long time to enter into a formal pact, anyhow. (However, in a case as 'the recognition of Japan's position in French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies.' it was resolved that the formality of an agreement may be issued.) To sum up, they agreed to carry out the matter quickly. Furthermore, it was unanimously approved that the detail of concrete problems involved in each article be carefully studied.
Plan for Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.
(Drafted July 12th 1940)
I. The object of strengthening the harmony.
The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position inthe face of the world situation after the European War.
II. Japanese-German coalition.
Principle-- To maintain an intimate connection with each other and to have a concrete political understanding as regards the mutual assistance in diplomatic and economic affairs.
Points
(1),(a) Germany promises Japan:
(i) not to interfere with the autonomy or independence of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other races of the South Seas areas, to recognize that the above areas are within the sphere of Japan's influence, and to approve and support Japan's political leadership and cooperation in those areas;
(ii) to give proper support for the disposition of the China Incident;
(iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.
(b) Japan promises Germany:
(i) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under the German leadership;
(ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;
(iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activity of Germany in China and in the South Seas.
(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.
(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in order that the United States shall not interfere with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall adopt such a policy as to check the U.S., never supporting her.
(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.
(5) Though it would be good to have AmbassadorKURUSU negotiate with Foreign MinisterRIBBENTROP , if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.
III. Japanese-Italian coalition.
In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Supported and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany."
If I may interpose at this stage of the reading of the
article, there were apparently several plans presented. That may explain why
apparently some items seem so similar.
Plan for Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.
I. The object of strengthening the harmony.
The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in face of the world situation after the European War.
II . Japanese-German coaltition
Principle-- With the common aim of establishing a New World Order, Japan and Germany shall maintain close liaison with one another and shall in parallel engage in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas, and in Europe and Africa, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the above.
Points --
Mr. Tavenner, would it not be sufficient to point out the differences in the drafts? However, you are near the finish now; perhaps you better continue.
I may say there is just a little difference in a number of these paragraphs. It would be very difficult to point out the difference without reading the entire paragraph. The last paragraph however is the same.
Are the differences so important that we should have all three set out in full in the transcript?
Points:
(1),(a) Germany promises Japan:
(i) to recognize that French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Sees areas are, politically end economically within the sphere of Japan's influence and that they shall be able of their own free will to enjoy autonomy or independence in the future, to recognize accordingly that Japan's approval must be necessary for the alteration of their political status quo, and to support the economic development of Japan in those areas, notpreventing the implantation of her political power;
ii) to assure Japan of the indiscriminate treatment of her trade with Europe end Africa under the German influence, and to give favorable consideration to her other economic relations;
iii) to have harmony in economy andtechnique between Japan and Germany.
(b) Japan promises Germany:
i) to support the German policy in Europe and Africa, and to approve the German-directed New Order in Europe;
ii) to assure Germany the supply of essential materials in China and the South Seas;
iii) to recognize indiscriminate treatment of trade in China and the South Seas, and to give favorable consideration to German economic activities.
(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the parties should, enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.
(3) Japan and Germany shell cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outside the American continent, end if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan must not adopt such a policy as would support the United States. Again, both Japan and Germany shall make common cause with each other against the U. S. in their Central and South American policy.
(4) To contrive the fall of British influence by the partition of her colonies.
In order to facilitate Britain's surrender Japan shall check her as far as possible in East Asia by such measures as the withdrawal of British forces, demand for the disarmament of Hongkong (Singapore), demand for the cession of British territories in the South Seas, independence of India, Burma and others, capture of British ships. For this end, Germany shall give adequate political support for disposition of the China Incident.
(5) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.
(6) Though it would be good to have AmbassadorKURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shell be conducted at Tokyo.
The next item, III, is identical with III in the proceeding plan, so I will not read it.
Doctor KIYOSE.
In the beginning of page two, of the exhibit just read, exhibit 527, the third line
We refer it accordingly.
And another defense counsel has pointed out that these plans were made up at the time of the YONAI Cabinet and were not actually adopted by the Second KONOYE Cabinet.
That is a matter for evidence.
Mr. Tavenner.
In further regard to that document, I offer the second part of the conference in evidence, which will be set forth in prosecution document 1392.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1392 will receive exhibit No. 528.
This document bears the date of July 16,1940 and consists
of the minutes of the adjourned conference unifying the opinions of the
MINUTES OF JOINT CONFERENCE OF ARMY, NAVY, AND FOREIGN OFFICE AUTHORITIES OF INTENSIFICATION OF COALITION AMONG JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY.
At the Foreign Office on the 16th July 1940.
Attendances:
ANTO - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office "ISHIZAWA - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
(Withdrew before adjournment)
TAJIRI - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
TOKUNAGA, Secretary, the Foreign Office
TAKAYAMA, Lt. Colonel, the War Ministry
TANEMURA, Major, the General Staff Office
SHIBA, Commander, the Naval Ministry.
ANTO (Foreign Office) utters:For today, I request Army and Navy to give us their opinions concerning the plan (proposal) relating to the intensification of coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy which I gave you on the occasion of the previous conference. Please start with Army.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry):I agree upon this plan as a whole and will give you our opinion in details as to the meaning of the word NANYO /T.N. South Seas/ contained in the phrase 'the constructionof a new order in the Far East including the South Seas,' mentioned in clause 1, I would like to have it mean as Japan's intention to include the territory extending from Burma and the eastern part of India on the west to Australia and New Zealand on the east, but since there should be a South Seas of first sense and also of the second sense, the South Seas to be expressed as Japan's attitude for the present should be a narrower South Seas excluding Australia, New Zealand and Burma. Nevertheless, I think we should consider as Japan's attitude the NANYO of the wider sense.
ANTO (Foreign Office): As Japan's ideal, Australia, New Zealand and Burma, of course, should be included, but as a concrete question we should adopt the South Seas of the first sense for the time being. In regard to this point, I am wholly in agreement with Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry):I agree to that.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, in regard to the outline of clause (2), I wonder if it isn't necessary to discuss the point that is to become the basis of the outline, that is the fundamental point, before the outline is decided with Germany.
ANTO (Foreign Office): Since the fundamentalpoint is that since both countries are on a common footing -- that is, the establishment of a new order in Europe and Africa by Germany as her sphere of livelihood and the establishment of a new order in East Asia, including the South Seas, by Japan as her' sphere of livelihood, does it mean that both countries should recognize and respect each other's sphere and assist and cooperate in the establishment of the new order within the respective sphere?
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Yes.
ANTO (Foreign Ministry): I have no objection to the opinion of Lt, Colonel TAKAYAMA in regard to settling the fundamental point with Germany.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): That is, in regard to discussing this matter with Germany, the outline and details should be entered into only after the fundamental point has been discussed first.
ANTO (Foreign Ministry):I agree with you.
(Navy agrees)
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, let us go into the contents of the outline. In clause 1, there is a phrase 'not to interfere with the self-government and independence of the various races,' but I believe it is not necessary to make Germany express this.
ANTO (Foreign Office): It is there for the purpose of showing that Germany has no intention ofacquiring these territories.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I don't think it is necessary to make her say it distinctly. I wonder if it would not be sufficient if we make her recognize the fact that French Indo-China and Dutch Indies are within the sphere of livelihood of Japan and Japan's political leadership in these areas. After all, it will be 'recognize the fact that the South Seas area is within the sphere of livelihood of Japan.'
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, the question is about the meaning of political leadership. The strongest meaning of this is occupation, but we are not thinking of occupation at present. Anyway, it is necessary that the whole country conspire and unite on the point of political leadership and make Germany recognize as strong a political leadership as possible.
ANTO (Foreign Office): I think here lies one of the most difficult points in regard to the question of intensification of this problem. As seen hazily by the cable from Ambassador SATO, isn't it the intention of Germany to grasp the political leadership for herself and give Japan only the economic interest in regard to French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies, In other words, it appearsas if Germany will not recognize Japan's right of political leadership.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I feel that way myself, and it is necessary to force Germany to recognize as strong a leadership as possible of French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies.
ANTO (Foreign Office): I think this point will be the first thing argued when the talk on the question of intensification of this matter is taken up, but according to the cable from Consul-General YAMAJI, the other day, Germany reportedly is willing to offer Japan the eastern part of the Dutch Indies, In another sense, it means that Germany is taking Java, Sumatra, etc.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to what attitude Germany will take towards Japan in future concerning the Dutch Indies and French Indo-China depends largely upon the attitude she will take towards Soviet Russia after the war. Since Germany has no intention to dispose of Russia immediately after the war, she might leave French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies to Japan easier than expected. But if she were to start with the construction of a new order in Europe, the question of French Indo-China and Dutch Indies will become considerably troublesome.And as for Japan, she should, for the time being, consider that Germany has the intention of politically taking over French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and should be prepared for it. For that, a considerably firm determination is necessary.
ANTO (Foreign Office): I agree with you. We should object strongly to Germany's intention to assume political leadership in Dutch Indies, etc.
ISHIZAWA (Foreign Ministry): I agree completely.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office):I think the question of French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies depends entirely upon naval power and Germany, who has no naval power, will not be able to oppose Japan within the sphere of Japanese naval influence no matter how stoutly she may resist. Consequently, the question lies solely in Japan's determination.
ANTO (Foreign Office): I think you are right, but Germany, in such an event, might try to utilize Russia and check Japan from the north. This, too, is a point to be taken into consideration.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office): I don't think that even Soviet Russia would be a tool of Germany and carelessly meddle into this with the hope of securing the northern section of Manchuria.Soviet Russia would probably seek for the Near East and India.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): How about setting aside (B) 'to assume a means of checking to expedite the surrender of England' as a separate clause, together with foregoing clause 'to give appropriate support for the disposition of the China incident This is because it is a current problem or a matter to be concluded in a short period rather than one that will regulate the future relation between Japan and Germany.
ANTO (Foreign Office): As this was considered as a recompensation for Germany in return for recognition of the New Order in East Asia including the South Seas and for her support in the disposition of the Incident, there is no reason for any objection against making it a separate clause.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): It is stated that a restraining measure will be taken against England, but I wonder if there is any really effective restraining measure?
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): It's very difficult as a concrete plan.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Then, is it not necessary to change the working of this clause?
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): The newspapers can be utilized.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): The checking of England by Japan and Germany's support for the disposition of the incident can be regarded as balancing each other, and in regard to the recognition of the new regime to be considered in connection with the disposition of the incident, the balance can be obtained by the recognition of Poland and so forth, but in regard to obtaining her cooperation in the economic construction of China, I wonder if the check against England can't be regarded as its balance?
ANTO (Foreign Office): As compensation for her cooperation in the economic construction, the supplying of wolfram and other things, which Germany wants, and her participation in the enterprise to some extent can be considered.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I think we should refrain from allowing her to participate in the enterprises in China as much as possible.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office): In case of the worst, we should show our generosity of allowing her to participate in as much as half of the enterprises.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): We do that, Iwant that to be restricted to the minimum.
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): As for Germany's political support in connection with the disposition of the incident, it probably is her peace mediation for the time being. In regard to the economic problem, it is cooperation in economy and technique, and as compensation, we can give Germany's heavy industries markets in China and the South Seas.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): There is a necessity to consider Italy together with Germany.
TAJIRI (Foreign Ministry):As compensation, Germany has been conducting coastal trade since the outbreak of the incident, and I believe it better to recognize such things as this coastal trade and industrial technical assistance. I wonder if it isn't necessary for Japan to learn economic technique from Germany.
ANTO (Foreign Office):It's necessary. America's heavy industry is rich in materials. In other words, it is a heavy industry of the rich and Germany's is that of the poor. As for Japan, it is necessary for her to learn Germany's poor man's heavy industry.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office):For Japan, it is extremely important for her to develop the heavyindustry in Manchuria. Consequently, if we can't expect to take in anything from America, we must think of taking in these from Germany. If Germany's technique flows into Soviet Russia after the war, it will be a grave problem for Japan. We should consider introducing Germany's technique into Manchuria and China after the war.
ANTO (Foreign Office): Returning our discussion to the beginning, does it mean, after all, that there is no concrete plan for checking England?
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): England can be checked to a certain extent by utilizing the newspapers.
ANTO (Foreign Office): The instigation of an independent movement in India and Burma secretly according to the change of international situation can be regarded as an effective check against England.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office): I think it would be an extremely effective check against England to take a strong attitude in regards to problems against England in connection with the China incident; for instance, taking a strong attitude in regard to problems pertaining to Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsen.
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): Depending on theoccasion, it may be a splendid idea to demand for the disarmament of Hongkong.
ANTO (Foreign Office)After all, it means firstly to exclude the political rights and interest of England from China and secondly, to instigate the independence of Burma and India.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): These should be executed to the extent of not resorting to arms.
ANTO (Foreign Office): As for the Navy, couldn't she make use of vessels of unknown nationality?
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): That could be done.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): Is there no measures to take a step further and strike England rather than to check her?
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): That can be done when Chiang Kai-shek surrenders, but, for the time being, we had better not do it.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): Doesn't it mean that we had better participate in the war upon the disposition of the incident?
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): For the time being, it is best to proceed according to the present degree.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): If we discuss thisquestion of checking England with Germany, Germany might start ask us to occupy Singapore.
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): We can tell her that we will do that when the incident is settled.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office):It would be all right if we claim that the attack on Singapore is to be carried out on our own accord.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): After all, it would be better to negotiate with Germany with the attitude that Japan will have no responsibility in regard to the question of taking part in the war, but may engage in a war with England independently.
There is omitted -- unless it has been put in in ink -- a statement "all agreed" after the paragraph which I just read.
It appears in ink in our copies.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to the relations with Soviet Russia mentioned in clause 2, it is to keep peace for the time being and eventually to guide Soviet Russia in such a way as to conform to the common standpoint of Japan and Germany. Depending on the occasion, the turning of Soviet Russia's spearhead toward Burma and India can be considered.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry):Regarding our relations with America, it is possible as a future problem that Japan and Germany may take a joint action in South America against America and that whether Japan should sustain Germany in her economical policy toward South America may become a problem. Hence, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for Japan to consider now the possibility of taking joint action with Germany against America after the establishment of the new order in East Asia a few years hence?
ANTO (Foreign Office): In regard to the question of America, there is a necessity of giving it greater consideration. Germany, at present, is quite optimistic about America and concerning the post-war administration, 'Schaht' is thinking of getting American loan, while other Nazis are thinking of depending on the 'barter' system. After all, as to what attitude Germany will take against America, we cannot tell until after Germany has defeated England. At present, Germany's attitude is 'America should not interfere in European problems.' From the Japanese-German discussions, we can't tell anything more than what has been indicated in the plan at present.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): That's right, but as for Japan's mental attitude, it is necessary thatshe take into consideration those matters heretofore discussed. In this respect, it is proper to have in mind Japanese-German cooperation in the economic expansion into South America.
This is a convenient break. We will adjourn until half-past one.
AFTERNOON SESSION
The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
Mr. Tavenner.
TAJIRI (Foreign Office): I think Germany is looking down upon American economy as a money economy inconsidering her future economic debouchment into South America. At any rate, it is necessary at least to sound out what Germany is thinking of in regard to America and Soviet Russia for the future. For Germany, America's support of Soviet Russia is a great threat.
TANEMURA (General Staff Office): From my opinion, a dispute between Germany and America may materialize before long. There is the possibility of a dispute being caused by America's defense against Germany's debouchment into South America. As South America is a very good market for Japan also, I think we should plan to undertake debouchment into South America in cooperation with Germany.
ANTO (Foreign Office): After all, these matters are contained in the policy restrictingAmerica to only within the American continent. Although it is necessary to hold, as our mental attitude, the points stated by Lt. Colonel TAKAYAMA, won't the original draft be about enough for the time being as points to be written on paper?
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry):As to the question of our obligation to participate in the war stated in clause 4, Japan as already discussed shall not be bound, but we should keep in mind that we might have to wage war against England independently.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): In conclusion, I agree to the original draft in regard to cooperation with Italy.
TAJIRI (Foreign Ministry): What about drawing up a simpler plan separately with Italy?
ANTO (Foreign Office): We had better to treat Italy in the same way as and at the same time with Germany.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to Germany and Italy, we must recognize that there is a difference between them of economic and political power heretofore possessed in China.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Regarding the question of Soviet Russia, won't it be necessaryto change our proposal to Italy?
ANTO (Foreign Office): From the latest report of Mr. Chuichi Ohashi, Italy is considering the use of Mohammedans to advance into the Iran and Indian area. Should Soviet Russia advance into Iran, Italy herself would have a considerable interest in regard to the question of Soviet Russia, At any rate, Germany and Italy, though different in degrees, are in a common position In regard to the question of Soviet Russia, Therefore we could make a similar proposal to both Germany and Italy.
ANTO (Foreign Office): Nextly, I like to hear the opinion of Navy side.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry):We agree to what Lt. Colonel TAKAYAMA has already stated. In strengthening the cooperation between Japan and Germany, we should make the recognition of the respective spheres of new order and the cooperation between Japan and Germany the framework of the plan and never to show that Japan wants things. Besides, in strengthening our coalition, I wonder if it isn't necessary to push the discussion further in regard to the American and Soviet Russian problems. There is no real difference between Japan and America.Present oppositions between Japan and America are most economical and for the most part emotional. Besides, in regard to the Soviet relationship, it is necessary that Japan and Germany guide it profitably. Only it is a question as to whether these points should be exposed in the text of the treaty.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): The problem of America and Soviet Russia should not be exposed, but should be dealt with in a secret clause.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): What kind of steps are you going to take to realize this original draft (plan)?
ANTO (Foreign Office): Perhaps this will be discussed between Japan and Germany and the main points exchanged through official documents.
ANTO (Foreign Ministry): Now the opinion among us officials concerned has been unified. It is essential that no time be lost in its execution.
(All agreed.)
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I think I could settle with Army along the line discussed heretofore.
SHIBA (Naval Ministry): It's same with Navy.
TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): If the discussion is to be held in Germany, it may be necessary to goand explain our intention, as it is impossible to express it thoroughly by telegram,
(All agreed)
THE PRESIDENT:
Mr. McKinney.
I tender in evidence prosecution's document 1008, 4028-A and 4028-B. The first is Foreign Minister ARITA's radio speech relating to the so called "New Order in East Asia."
The latter two documents set forth the circumstances under which the speech was made.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1008 will receive exhibit No. 529; and document 4028-A, exhibit No. 530; and document 4028-B, exhibit No. 531.
Japan's ideal since the foundation of the Empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in the world. Our foreign policy has also been based upon this ideal, for which we have not hesitated at times even to fight by staking our national existence.
What the entire mankind longs for is the firm establishment of world peace. But it goes without saying that peace can never endure unless it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. Unfortunately,however, the establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realization at the present stage of human progress. In order to realize such a great ideal, therefore, it seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally and economically should first form a sphere of their own co-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres. The cause of strifes mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity of some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrationalities and injustices of old. The war in Europe brings home the truth of this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international peace on a permanent foundation every effort must be exerted for the rectification of the blunders that have been committed in this regard.
It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettable, therefore, that there should be those who not only fail to understand Japan's great undertaking based upon thisfundamental principle, but on the contrary, obstruct the establishment of peace in East Asia by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek.
Sometimes there are those who would disapprove a change of thestatus quoby force of arms regardless of the reasonstherefore . It is for the purpose of bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has drawn is nothing other than a 'life-giving sword' that destroys evil and makes justice manifest.
The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially and economically very closely related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and the insuring thereby the stability ofthat sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion.
The idea to establish first a righteous peace in each of the various regions and then establish collectively a just peace for the whole world has long existed also in Europe and America. This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a center the peoples within that region are to secure their coexistence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere. It also presupposes that these groups will respect one another's individual characteristic, political, cultural and economic, and they will cooperate and fulfill one another's needs for their common good.
When the present European war broke out, the Japanese Government at once declared their policy of non-involvement and made it clear that this country did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the same time did not want to see the war spread into East Asia, Quite naturally Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia.
Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a new order in East Asia, is paying a serious attention to developments in theEuropean war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions --any development therein, and any disposal thereof-- is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo, 1 July 1940 1.30
Arrived: 1 July 1940 10.20 hours
No. 642 of 1.7
Refer D.N.B. Tokyo 482 ff re: Foreign Minister ARITA's radio speech on Japan's attitude in the international situation.
The originally intended attempt of the Foreign Minister to gain contact with internal political development by announcing a more active foreign political fixing of aims and thereby, to strengthen the cabinet's position: this is being wrecked by protests from the opposition led by the army, which forced the original text to be substantially mutilated. This explains the lack of concrete ideas, a fact which a section of the press too, has pointed out.
The growing influence of the army also results from the stronger military attitude toward Hong Kong and Indo-China. Internal political developments show characteristic signs of initial oppression and indicate an early change of cabinet.
OTT
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo - 3 July 1940 1310 hours
Arrived " " " 2305 hours
No. 648 of 3 July
In answer to telegram of 2-7-4-0 (No. 542), according to a leading article in the, 'ASAHI' clearly inspired by the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Minister intended to stress in his radio speech that the present government has never deviated from the Axis policy, and has always had full sympathy for the German demand for a New Order in Europe, so much themore since Japan herself is striving for a New Order in Asia. The government is determined to consolidate Axis friendship. The army protested against this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above policy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and because the army wanted to avoid the YONAI-ARITA cabinet using a sudden stress on friendship with the Axis as a chess move to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, which is close to us and to save its own existence.
The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, who disclosed the original text ofARITA's speech to 'ASAHI' and announced the Army's protest publicly in a press conference, caused great indignation in army circles.
As I have learned confidentially, the Press Chief was arrested and grilled by the military police on account of this indiscretion.
OTT
I present prosecution's document 1632-X for introduction into evidence. It consists of excerpts from KIDO's diary showing the downfall of the YONAI-ARITA cabinet, the means by which it was accomplished, and the reasons therefore.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1632-X will receive exhibit No. 532.
Translation of the Diary of Marquis KIDO
1940
5 July. Telephone calls at 7:30 AM, from both the Director of the Police Bureau and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police. The gist of the story is as follows:
Since secret information was obtained relativeto the carrying out from 7:00 AM this morning of a direct action, which had for sometime been planned by the MAEDA faction, arrests were begun from 5:30 AM at several rendezvous places in the city. Their proposed objectives were Premier YONAI, Mr. MACHIDA, Count MAKINO, Baron HARADA, Baron ICHIKI, Mr. IKEDA, Admiral OKADA, Mr. YUASA and household Minister MATSUDAIRA. Besides nine pistols, two hand grenades, thirty swords and thirty beer bottles of benzine, many copies of a prospectus, stating why they were aroused to act, were confiscated.
Was received in audience at 11:40. I reported on the MAEDA affair and answered various questions cut by the Throne. I also stated to His Majesty that their actions were to blame but as to their motives, the administrators must reflect seriously upon them. Withdrew from the Palace at 12:15.
After that, exchanged frank opinions with Prince KONOYE in my room --
Mr. McKinney, we cannot follow you. You are not telling us what place you are proceeding from.
Yes, this starts at page top 2.
After that, exchanged frank opinions with Prince KONOYE in my room regarding the prospect of the campaign to strengthen the new political structure and the measures to be taken in case of a cabinet change. We talked from 7:40 to 8:20 and parted.
At 8:30 PM, Kozo OTA visited me and brought a message --"
Do let us find out from what part of the page you are reading and from what page.
It is the last paragraph on July 7.
You are not reading merely to get stuff into the transcript but to inform the Court.
7 July (Sunday) Fine.
At 8:30 PM, Kozo OTA visited me and brought a message from Baron HIRANUMA to the effect that he thought that at this time when rumors of a political change are rife there is no other person so suitable for appointment as Prince KONOYE.
8 July -- beginning with the second sentence, that is, the middle of page 2:
Vice-War Minister ANAMI called and expressedhimself as follows:
Now when a political change may be unavoidable within the next four or five days, and the military have been perfecting preparations to meet the abrupt changes in the latest world situation, the character of the YONAI cabinet is not at all suitable for making negotiations with Germany and Italy and it might even cause a fatal delay. The conclusion is that a cabinet change is inevitable in order to face this grave situation. The army unanimously will support Prince KONOYE's candidacy. Upon meeting Prince KONOYE after his return to Tokyo, the War Minister will take the opportunity to submit an important proposal to Premier YONAI.
Upon my mentioning that the selection of a Foreign Minister would be most difficult, he replied that the Army would leave such a question entirely to Prince KONOYE.
Right at the top of the next page is the next section to be read.
In the Army General Staff Office in recent days, the officers forming the central core presented their opinions to the leading staff members from the viewpoints of both political and military policies, as they anticipate that the personnel of the presentgovernment will never be able to sufficiently cope with the latest world situation. As a result, it is understood that the Chief of the Army General Staff, Prince KANIN, told the War Minister about the matter, and the War Minister has been much concerned about what measures to take. Such being the case, the expression of resolute determination by the War Minister may well depend upon the behavior of the Cabinet itself. And so on . . . .
If the Tribunal please, I think the transcript should show that the last paragraph which was read was a statement made by the Chief Aide-de-Camp.
It appears in the last sentence.
Yes, that is correct, on page 1.
It appears in the last sentence on page 1 that the Chief Aide-de-Camp made that statement -- the last sentence on page 2.
Next, July 16, the second sentence about the middle of page 3:
Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA telephoned this morning as follows:
War Minister HATA met Premier YONAI after 9:00 A. M. this morning and submitted his resignation.When told by the Premier to produce a successor, he replied that an answer may be expected by evening and left. As the Army cannot be expected to produce a successor, the Premier, after calling an extraordinary Cabinet meeting today, will probably have to go to the HAYAMA Imperial villa to submit a mass resignation.
Thereupon, I immediately requested the Grand Chamberlain, Chief Aide-de-Camp and HIROHATA the Lord Steward to Her Majesty the Empress to assemble in my room. I told them of the foregoing matter and we consulted about the Emperor's return trip and other matters. We made a provisional plan but decided to wait for the arrival of the Imperial Household Minister from Tokyo before making the final decision.
Upon the Emperor's return from the sea, was received in audience at 12:10 and reported to the Throne about the above matters.
Was again received in audience at 1:45, fully explained the procedure of selecting the leader of the incoming cabinet, which had previously been studied and decided upon and got his approval. The summary is as follows:
1. The Emperor requested the Lord Privy Seal to ask the President of the Privy Council and the former premiers about the selection of the head of the incoming cabinet and to report their answer after consultation with the Elder Statesman.
The Emperor will at the same time order the Grand Chamberlain to make arrangements to assemble the said personages in the Palace.
2. The Lord Privy Seal will arrange the council of these personages in the Palace and he himself will participate in it.
3. Further, the Lord Privy Seal himself will call on the Elder Stateman or will have the Chief Secretary do so to consult about the matter and report the result to the Throne.
The following information has been received from the Chief Aide-de-Camps He received a phone call from Vice-Minister ANAMI of the War Ministry, according to whom the state of affairs leading to the Minister's resignation, is as follows: Several days ago a memorandum containing the army's opinion on the present situation was submitted to the Premier, who summoned the War Minister this morning, and telling him that the army's idea was different from that of the present cabinet, asked himbluntly to resign in case of inconvenience. Thereupon the War Minister at once submitted his resignation. As the Premier further asked him to recommend his successor, the Three Chief Officers' Meeting was held from 2:30 P.M. but because of the foregoing situation it was extremely difficult to make any recommendation."
Now skipping one paragraph and continuing:
Premier YONAI came to Hayama from Tokyo at 6:40 P.M. and explained the details of the resignation en bloc. It was about as I have set it down. As a result of the conference of the three chiefs it was said that although the selection of a successor was not being refused, it was difficult to choose one and no forecast was possible.
Premier YONAI in announcing to the Cabinet his decision in favor of a resignation en bloc did not as was usual in the past call each minister Separately to his room and talk to him. Instead he assembled all the members in the cabinet meeting room and stating first that this was not a cabinet meeting, expressed his decision. At this, War Minister HATA scowled, but straightway stood up and made a speech. That is the story.
At this time I communicated to the PremierHis Majesty's opinion which I had previously learned and the Premier was deeply moved.
After supper the Premier was received in audience by the Emperor and tendered the resignation.
I was received in audience at 7:40 P.M. and was requested to choose a successor. To this I replied that in response to the order I would request a council of the Senior Statesmen tomorrow in the Palace to discuss the matter.
In the course of my audience with the Emperor, the Emperor told me the circumstances surrounding his summoning of War Minister HATA at the time when the Imperial order for cabinet formation was given to Admiral YONAI.
The Emperor said that he had not shown him any special favor, although there was a gross misunderstanding about the matter. He had been told that KONOYE also was of the opinion that it would be well to question HATA and that YUASA, too, thought that questioning would be all right. He had called HATA and had asked him whether the Army was willing to cooperate with YONAI, to whom he, the Emperor, had given the Imperial order. As HATA had replied that the Army would cooperate, the Emperor had said that that was fine and had not given any orders.
17 July, Wednesday
-- next page,
Mrs. Keiko SOMA called. After a short talk with her I went to the office at 10. Before 1 o'clock, in response to the invitation telegram from Grand Chamberlain MOMOTAKE, President HARA of the Privy Council and six former Premiers, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, HAYASHI, KONOYE and HIRANUMA, assembled in the West Ante-Chamber of the Palace, and from 1 o'clock a meeting was held in the West No. 2 Room to select the head of the incoming cabinet following the presentation of resignation by Premier YONAI.
The meeting was opened with a speech by Assistant Grand Chamberlain KANROJI, who acting in place of the Grand Chamberlain conveyed His Majesty's opinions and thoughts.
Then I stated to them that I had been told by the Emperor to consult the Elder Statesman about the matter to report the result to the throne; that the meeting had been called today to enable a frank exchange of views on the subject; that the meeting, because of the nature of the matter to be discussed, could not be called a conference, and consequently the decision would not be put to such a formality as voting, and that their informal talk and free and frank exchange of views were requested so as not toleave anything undone regarding the selection of the succeeding premier.
HARA--All I know about the reason for the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet is from the newspapers. If you know the truth I would like to hear about it.
Lord Privy Seal--I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at HAYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy Which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favor a political reapproachment with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being separated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence he has come to the point of resigning.
WAKATSUKI:I feel that there is no one fitfor the Premier's post at this time except Prince KONOYE. I hope Prince KONOYE will take the field.
HARA:It would be fine if Prince KONOYE took the field.
HIRANUMA, HAYASHI, OKADA: We quite agree with Baron WAKATSUKI's opinion.
Prince KONOYE: In view of the circumstances leading to the general resignation of the YONAI cabinet, the one to take charge of the present situation should be well versed in military affairs with a full understanding of them. As I do not have such ability, and have made no preparations for it, I would like to see someone more fit for the post selected.
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal:I have heard that the views of the military leaders are overwhelmingly in favor of Prince KONOYE's taking the field. Besides, there are points in the present actions of the army which may be understood as having been based on the assumption that Prince KONOYE would rise. I do not think that there is any other person fit for the post. I earnestly hope that Prince KONOYE will come forward.
HIRANUMA: It is a bad example that the cabinet should fall on account of the War Minister's resignation, and it is regretabble that we have oftenhad such examples. It should be that a successor would be found and the cabinet be able to continue. However, because in practice the custom has come-about of having the three chiefs make the recommendation, such situations as today's arise. It is reasonable that Prince KONOYE is concerned over this point, and I feel sorry for him having to take the field at this time. However, since we cannot find anyone else fit for the post, there is nothing for it but to earnestly ask Prince KONOYE to come forward. Moreover, since we are in this difficult position it is needless to say that every quarter not to speak of ourselves should endeavor to make it easy for the Prince to manage his task.
HIROTA: It seems the China Incident cannot be easily settled if the cabinet is as weak as it has been, and there is no other way but to continue the present state of affairs. Judged from this view point, it would also be a good thing to have a suitable military man capable of working closely with the Army and Navy. However, there is no such man. Besides, since the military themselves wish it there is no problem about asking Prince KONOYE to take the field. Lately we have had all kinds of rumors. TheLord Privy Seal must have made quite an investigation of them.
Lord Privy Seal: AS I have said before, according to the information we have received, various rumors are prevailing, but generally speaking, there is a strong hope that Prince KONOYE will take the field. Also at this time when the enc of the China Incident is gradually approaching, I feel that a large section of the public is of the opinion that there is no suitable person other than Prince KONOYE to form a strong cabinet.
Lord Privy Seal: I can easily see that you generally agree upon Prince KONOYE. After consulting the Elder Statesman, KIDO will report the reply to the throne.
Things took place as I have noted and the meeting was closed at 1:30 p.m. I sent Chief Secretary MATSUKAIRA to OKITSU by the 3:00 p.m. train to see Prince SAIONJI. Their Majesties returned from HAYAMA at 5:10 p.m. At 6:36 Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA telephoned me from Prince SAIONJI's villa at OKITSU that as the old prince was not only sick at that time but also knew little of the political situation, he could not take the responsibility of replying to the throne. So I answered that I understood. I wasreceived in audience by His Majesty at 7:00 p.m. I informed Him of the result of the meeting and of Prince SAIONJI's reply. Although Prince SAIONJI's reply to the throne was inevitable because of advanced age, His Majesty in order to show his respect wishes to ask the Elder statesman hereafter also. However, as I felt sorry to see the GENRO pressed for a reply, I asked the Emperor to call Prince KONOYE leaving that matter as it was. His Majesty gladly accepted my request. Accordingly the Emperor had the Grand Chamberlain summon Prince KONOYE by telephone. Again I was received in audience by His Majesty. I reported the details of this afternoon's meeting. At that time the Emperor spoke as follows:
'When War Minister HATA came to HAYAMA today to report to the throne on personnel, he told me what the opinion of the army is. Generally it was the same as that which KIDO had heard from HONAI yesterday. I told him that this business was very regrettable, but I felt it was one consolation that we could see where the responsibility lay, although there had been up till now many uncertain attitudes. HATA, who was once Chief Aide-de-Camp and who knows how busy I am at such times, was extremely sorry and had tears in his eyes.'
I retired from the Imperial presence at 7:40 p.m. On that occasion the Emperor asked me whether he might give KONOYE some advice, it being of a simple matter, which KIDO also had once mentioned. That is, that KONOYE should be prudent especially in the choice of Foreign and Finance Ministers at this time when the situation at home and abroad is grave.
Of course I replied that it would be a good idea to do so.
Prince KONOYE came to the Imperial Palace at eight. After having talked with me for a short time, he went into the Imperial presence and received the Imperial command. I am told that on that occasion the Emperor gave him the foregoing advice. He, after having retired from the Imperial presence, again talked with me. He told me that he would go to the Peers' Club after that on that day and would invite the War and Navy Ministers. He intends to ask the War Minister to select a person who can cooperate with the Navy and the Navy Minister, to choose a person who can cooperate with the Army. He will wait till the selection is made and on the next day or the day following will have the Foreign Minister join them for a full discussion of national defense, diplomacy, cooperation between Army and Navy and therelation between the Supreme Command and the Government. And only after they come to an agreement in their views will he begin selecting the other Cabinet Ministers. He said that he wished to have KOREMATSU as his secretary and asked me to use my influence for that purpose. He left at 8:40.
I was summoned by His Majesty and received in audience at 8:45. I reported on Prince KONOYE's policy in regard to the formation of the cabinet. The Emperor seemed to be satisfied with it. I retired from the Imperial presence at 9:10. I reached home at 9:30. I received a treatment from Doctor WATANABE.
Quote
Prosecution document 4028C is offered in evidence. It is a telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo for the German General Staff.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4028C will receive exhibit No. 533.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo 17 July 1940
Arrival 17 July 1940.
For General Staff, Army Attache Division.
No. 697 of 17.7.
1) In accordance with the Cabinet change, forced by the Army, a speedy Japanese transition to a more active anti-English policy is to be expected. I have strictly confidential information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hongkong in the case that it might be necessary.
2) To 340-46gk there: Senior Attache Admiral Wennecker. Execution is fraught with difficulties asquestion of military questions such as military policy and war economy in Japan, were heretofore predominantly the business of the army.
3) Japanese Army asked through a mediator, if it can count in the future on delivery of captured arms, possibly in settlement for Japanese delivery of raw materials. Reference to Foreign Office W2548g of May 15th according to which discussion by Wehrmacht Attache's on delivery of implements of war is forbidden.
4) Re: inquiry 9563/40g of June 6.
Japanese army ready to deliver; request information re amount. As Nitro-Glycerine and T.N.T. are dangerous to transport as finished products, request information re raw material needs.
5) Can a visa for Inf/Captain TANAKA for a two-year stay as a student in Germany be obtained? Supplement to Tel. N. 645, July 2nd.
MAZKI. OTT.
I offer in evidence prosecution's document 1632Y to show the military activity of the General Staff at this period.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1632Y will receive exhibit No. 534.
Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 14 July 1940.
14 July Sunday Cloudy.
Went to the Imperial Villa at 2 p.m. in response to the Emperor's request and was received in audience at 2:15. Was asked by the Emperor whether an order (which had been secretly resorted by the Prince, the Chief of the General Staff, for heavy artillery mobilization for the purposes of the South China campaign) had been fully cleared with the Government. I replied that I would ask the Chief Aide-de-Camp to inquire of the War Minister regarding the liason on this matter, and if the liaison had not been sufficient, I myself would ask the Premier.
Left the Emperor then and at once got in touch with the Chief Aide-de-Camp on that matter.
Learned from the Aide-de-Camp that he had heard as follows from the War Ministers At the Four Ministers' Conference on the 12th (which the Finance Minister was specially invited to attend) the results of a careful study were that since in any case any preparations at all would require a month and a half, they had agreed to push preparations. It was decided at a cabinet meeting that a further cabinet decisionwould be required if actual operations were undertaken. After inquiring by phone as to Foreign Minister ARITA's opinion and receiving the same sort of answer as that from the War Minister, I reported in person to the Emperor to the above effect at four o'clock, and the Emperor was pleased to hear my reply.
At that time the Emperor said one thing and another about the change in the government. He said that he still today had faith in the YONAI Cabinet, and that though a change of Cabinet was inevitable in view of domestic and foreign conditions, he wished to have his feelings conveyed to YONAI. I said that I would arrange to have the Emperor's feelings conveyed to YONAI at the prope
Prosecution's documents 4028D, 4028E, 4023F and 4029C, relating to the membership of the new cabinet and the strengthening of Japanese-German relations are offered in evidence.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document 4028D will receive exhibit No. 535. Document No. 4028E will receive exhibit No. 537. 4028F will receive exhibit No. 538.
Correction: Prosecution's document No. 4028D will receive exhibit No. 534.
Correction again: Prosecution's document
Go ahead with the reading of 535.
Document No. 4028D.
Telegram. (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo 18 July 1940
Arrived 18 July 1940
No. 699 of 18.7. Very urgent:
Appendix to telegram of 17th No. 696.
MATSUOKA just told me through Admiral GODO confidentially that he accepted position of Foreign Minister and asks for friendly cooperation.
OTT.
Document 4028E. Telegram (Secret Cipher Process).
Tokyo: 20 July 1940.
We haven't received those yet. Read 536 so far as material. Leave out those.
All right, sir.
Prince KONOYE is building his government in sections. Up till now, in addition to the appointment of MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister, it is certain that Lieutenant General TOJO has been called as War Minister and Admiral YOSHIDA retained as Navy Minister. Yesterday there was long discussion between them and KONOYE re the fundamentals of future foreign and domestic policies, where, according to a press announcement, KONOYE obtained agreement. Details not yet known. MATSUOKA's appointment was generally approved by the press, as a new orientation of Japanese foreign policy is expected from him with certainty. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. . . (1 group garbled) expressed themselves in a similar vein at press interviews.
OTT.
That is the telegram that was sent and received on the 20th of July.
4028F.
The Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy told me today that during the as yet unfinished creation of the New Japanese cabinet, there was an unusual procedure, viz., that before the completion of the cabinet, 4 of its members -- Prime Minister KONOYE, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO together with, member of the previous cabinet, Navy Minister YOSHIDA, came together and drew up an authoritative foreign policy program for the future cabinet. These4 men have the decisive positions in the cabinet. Among other things, their foreign policy program contained a rapprochement with the Axis powers.
WOERMANN.
That is dated the 22nd of July, 1940. Berlin. It doesn't appear what it is. It looks like a memorandum.
If the Tribunal please, perhaps the prosecution could enlighten the defense as to who Woermann is.
Who is he, Woermann?
He is a member of the German Foreign Ministry.
Tokyo or Berlin?
I don't know where he is now.
I mean, where was he at the time?
Berlin.
Document 4029-C:
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process). Tokyo, 2 August 1940.
A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937.
That is not admitted in evidence and we haven't copies of it. The prosecution is becoming slightly disorganized.
We have exhibit 537.
It has been read. It is this document dated Berlin, 22 July 1940, signed by
Woermann. Now we have placed before us a document No. 4029-C. It is a
telegram from Ott, opening with a
Yes, sir.
Prosecutions document No. 4029-C will receive exhibit No. 538.
A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.
Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far-reaching influence in this capacity.
OTT.
Quote
Mr. Tavenner.
I desire to introduce in evidence prosecution document 1632-Z. It is an entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary of 18 July 1940.
Is there some reason for not having these in chronological order? Exhibit 538 is dated 2 August 1940.
There is no reason.
This entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary dated 18 July 1940 is admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 1632-Z will receive exhibit No. 539.
I will begin to read beginning with the fourth paragraph, near the center of the page. I believe it is the sixth paragraph.
I was again received in audience this afternoon from 2:25 to 2:50. The Emperor stated that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister and Tomoyuki YAMASHITA for Inspector-General of the Air Force but that he thought the procedure was wrong, for Prince KONOYE was still in the midst of forming a cabinet and had not yet acceptedTOJO for the post, and, as he thought that the action was rather over hasty, he had asked the War Minister whether he did not think the action as being out of order.
Being impressed with the reasonableness of the Emperor's opinion after I had left the palace and on the occasion of my talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp, after expressing my idea, I told him that I hoped for liaison by the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent.
The Tribunal's attention is directed to those of the accused who, according to their personnel records now in evidence, were called to major positions in the Japanese Government at the time of the change in the cabinet, or within a few months thereafter. They are as follows.
Well, do you want to repeat them all unless they include the accused?
No, sir, only those of the accused.
If the Tribunal please, at the commencement of this phase,
counsel mentioned all these names, and he has repeated them at least once,
and I believe twice, since then during the phase. Now, I cannot see the
purpose of doing this continuously during
Well, it is an advantage to have our minds readily and correctly informed at vital stages. There is no undue influence in that. It probably would be an advantage to have the names of the accused who were in that cabinet repeated here.
If it please the Tribunal, there is no overlapping of the recital of positions. The previous recital that I made had not included this particular period.
Well, proceed, Mr. Tavenner.
DOHIHARA, Kenji, appointed Supreme War Councillor, 28 September 1940.
HATA, Shunroku, appointed Military Councillor, 22 July 1940.
HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, appointed Minister without portfolio, 6 December 1940, and appointed Home Minister on 21 December 1940.
HOSHINO, Naoki, appointed President of the Planning Board and Minister of State without portfolio, 22 July 1940.
KIDO, Koichi, continued to hold the positionof Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to which he was appointed on 1 June 1940.
MUTO, Akira, appointed Councillor of the South Seas Bureau of the Overseas Affairs Ministry, on 26 December 1940.
We will recess now for fifteen minutes.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
Mr. Tavenner.
OKA, Takasumi, appointed Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs, the Naval Ministry, and also a member of the Board of Admirals on 15 October 1940; appointed Councillor to the Bureau of General Affairs on 7 November 1940; appointed Secretary of the National General Mobilization Council on 8 November 1940; appointed Councillor to the Cabinet Planning Board on 21 November 1940; appointed Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization, the Overseas Affairs Ministry, on 26 December 1940.
OSHIMA, Hiroshi, re-appointed the Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany on 20 December 1940.
TOGO, Shigenori, continued in his position as Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I offer for identification only prosecution's document 2137
from which I desire to introduce in evidence two separate and distinct
documents, one of which is the Cabinet decision of 26 July 1940, and the
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 2137 will receive for identification only exhibit No. 540.
Prosecution's document No. 2137-D will receive exhibit No. 541.
"Outline of the Basic National
Policy
The world is now on the threshold of a stupendous historic change. New political, economic and cultural orders are in the process of creation on the basis of the growth and development of several groups of nations. Japan is also faced by a great ordeal unparalleled in history. At this juncture,if we are to carry out a national policy truly in consonance with the lofty ideal on which our nation is founded, it is of the most urgent necessity to effect a fundamental renovation of the government administration along all lines, and to march forward toward the completion of a national defence structure, by surmounting all difficulties. The general principles of the basic national policy have been therefore formulated as follows:
1. Basic Policy.
The fundamental aim of Japan's national policy lies in the establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty ideal ofHakko Ichiuon which the Empire is founded. First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center. We will therefore speedily secure for herself an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation and march forward toward the realization of the national policy by mobilizing the total strength of the nation.
2. National Defense and Foreign Policy.
In the light of the new external andinternal circumstances of the Empire, we will so amplify armaments as to ensure the execution of national policy on the basis of a state structure for national defense through manifestation of the nation's total strength.
The fundamental aim of Japan's foreign policy at present lies in the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia. Attention will be focussed upon a successful settlement of the China Affair, while, by taking a longrange view of the great world change, constructive and elastic measures will be adopted in order to advance the national fortunes of the Empire.
3. Renovation of the Internal Structure.
The urgent task concerning the country's internal administration is to renovate all branches of the government in accordance with the fundamental principle of the national polity, and to lay down a firm foundation for a national defense state structure. For this purpose, we will aim at the realization of the following items:
i. In parallel with the renovation of the educational system in full accord with the fundamental principle of the national polity, we will establish national morality which attachesthe first importance to the idea of service to the state by rejecting all thoughts of selfishness and material gains. And we will aim at the encouragement of scientific spirit.
ii. We will strive for a coordinated unity of government by setting up a new national political structure.
(a) Organizing the nation anew on the basis of cooperation between government and people, and of service to the state, every man according to his occupation.
(b) Reform of the Diet system so as to conform to the new national political structure.
(c) Creation of a new government service system through fundamental renovation of the administrative methods with a view to effecting unity and expedition.
iii.Establishment of the foundation for a national defense economy on the basis of autonomous construction of the economics of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, with this Empire as the center.
(a) Establishment of Japan's economic self-sufficiency policy, making Japan, Manchoukuo and China as a single unit, and embracing the whole of Greater East Asia.
(b) Execution of a planned economy through cooperation of government and people; especially perfection of a unified control system over production, distribution and consumption of vital commodities.
(c) Establishment of a financial plan aimed at the development of coordinated economic powers; also, strengthening of financial control.
(d) Renovation of the trade policy in line with the new world situation.
(e) Establishment of the measures for self-supply of the nation's daily necessities, especially staple food stuffs.
(f) An epochal expansion of important industries, especially nervy, chemical end machine industries.
(g) An epochal development of science, and rationalization of production.
(h) Improvement and replenishment of transportation and communication facilities in line with the new world situation.
(i) Establishment of a land development plan aimed at the development of the coordinated national strength of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.
4. Establishment of the Permanentpolicies for the enhancement of the mental qualities and physical powers of the people which constitutes the motive force for the execution of national policy, and for the increase of population; and especially fundamental policies for the stabilization end development of agriculture and agricultural communities.
5. A decisive measure will be taken to rectify the inequality of sacrifices on the part of the people, attendant upon the execution of the national policy. Welfare measures will be fully carried out, end the living conditions of the people renovated, so as to ensure a living standard truly befitting a stout-hearted and strong-bodied people capable to survive ten years of trials and hardships and surmount the national crisis.
I offer in evidence prosecution's document 4029-A, 4029-B, 4029 and 1590-C, all four relate to conferences in which Ambassador KURUSU and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA pressed the subject of a renewal of negotiations for closer Japanese-German relations and declared the intention of Japan to construct the so-called "New Order of Greater Asia."
Admitted on the usual terms.
The proper designation should be 1590-A & C.
Prosecution's document No. 4029-A will receive exhibit No. 542; document No. 4029-B will receive exhibit No. 543; document No. 4029 will receive exhibit No. 544; and document No. 1590-A & C will receive exhibit No. 545.
Mr. Logan.
If the Tribunal please, with respect to document 2137-D,
prosecution's exhibit 541, I think it
is important that the certificate attached thereto be called to the
Tribunal's attention. Apparently that document was prepared by the Japanese
I will read prosecution's document 4029-A in evidence as exhibit 542.
Yes.
Telegraph, Berlin, 1 August 1940.
The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy, For his, KURUSU's, ownworld two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it firmly fixes its position. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.
The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspondto his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to he estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards USA should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded of the fact that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.
Nevertheless, he, KURUSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the Japanese weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to Germanwishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, and, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future.
I had the feeling that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this /intervention/ would not be quite timely according to German opinion.
The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about the fact that this advice must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important as hitherto and whether the new Japanese Cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.
Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinionthat the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.
To
The Reichs Foreign Minister
"Signed WEISAECKER."
I will now read prosecution's document 4029-B in evidence as exhibit 543.
By Teletype, Berlin., 2 August 1940.
In addition to the memorandum, concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed his hope that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that Japan not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.
Hereby submitted to the German Foreign Minister. (Signed) WEIZACKER.
I will now read in evidence prosecution's document 4029 in evidence as exhibit 544. I will begin reading at the third paragraph.
Who wrote this? Weizsacker?
The third paragraph begins with the words "the specific point".
If the Tribunal please, the defense objects to this document. It does not appear to whom it was sent or from whom it was sent.
If it please the Tribunal, it is an enemy captured document found with other enemy captured documents, and it is directed to the state -- the Reich Foreign Minister.
It comes within the Charter although it does not bear a signature. That only goes to weight, but coming from that source and being about the subject matter, it may have considerable weight.
If the Tribunal please, we don't see how it would be possible for the defense to meet a situation like this not knowing who sent the communication. How can we make an investigation into it?
Well, the prosecution should tell us who wrote this if they know, or can find out, but their failure to do either will not render the document inadmissible nor deprive it of weight.
How is it that exhibit 545 bears an earlier date than exhibit 544
The reference to the first paragraph of document 544 shows that it relates to a conference that took place on the first day of August which is the same date as the exhibit to which your Honor just referred. The document in question, although not bearing a signature, shows the Foreign Office file number of the German Government and the context of it shows plainly the matter to which it is addressed.
The specific point, however, with which KURUSU concerned himself for the longest period of time at his present visit today, was not Japan's relationship to Russia, America, or England, but the new order in the so-called Great East Asia sphere, which Japan is aiming at. Ambassador OTT also touches this subject in his telegraphic report, but KURUSU repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, in the following way: Japan wants to organize the East Asia sphere, including the South Seas, on a broad basis. MATSUOKA mentioned to OTT that Japan wants to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everybody should come to his rights there. Japan for her part would adhere to these three basic principles, but would then expect that no European or American country would violate these principles. The matter concerns itself with ideals, which if correctly understood, lie in the common interest. KURUSU named Japan, Manchukuo, and China as the core of the Great East Axis sphere, for which he used the term East Asia 'Axis'.
KURUSU went on to say that, though Minister SATO had received the impression of an unchangedfriendly German attitude toward Japan here, he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship, and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese plans for the East Asia sphere.
The Ambassador went so far to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE, in order to adjust their foreign general policy and the corresponding cabinet talks in Tokyo would first have to clearly see how we stand regarding the above. KURUSU did not refer to the desinteressement on these overseas problems, which we expressed to the Japanese in May of this year, but it was clear - and he obviously spoke under orders from Tokyo - what he was aiming at.
According to the description by KURUSU, OTT did not allow himself any more than I today to be drawn into this field of discussion.
At the end, KURUSU expressed the hope, to be able to discuss these far-reaching problems soon with the Reich Foreign Minister.
Herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister.
I will now read prosecution document No. 1590 A and C, in evidence as exhibit No. 545:
AN OUTLINE OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA ANDGERMAN AMBASSADOR OTT
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA invited German Ambassador OTT and they had a conversation between 5 and 6:40 PM on August 1, 1940, the gist of which is as follows:
MATSUOKA:'I informed you the other day that no talking would be necessary between Japan and Germany, nor you and me. My feeling, however, is just as you know, and as I mentioned it the other day, I am neither pro-German nor pro-British, but so to speak, pro-Japanese. So that I dare to oppose the fact of leaving our destiny to any foreign country or foreigner. But I think that Fuehrer HITLER and Foreign Minister of the Reich must know the fact as well as Your Excellency knows it, that I am one of the proposers and originators of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern pact. Later, when the problem of the Japanese-German Military Alliance occurred, you saw my attitude and I think it is unnecessary to explain neither my feeling nor my standpoint for Germany and Italy repeatedly. As you may find out easily, both the government and the people have inclined to strengthen the power of the Axis, but it is not decided yet in the cabinet council. I cannot persuade Premier KONOYE and other members of the cabinet, unless I know at least the outline of Germany's intention or attitude to the thought Iembrace before it will be carried out. In other words, I am very anxious to know what the German attitude is on my point of view, or I am sorry to say that I can hardly carry it out.'
OTT: 'It may be natural but I want to know what Japan is going to do. Without knowing it concretely, I think Berlin cannot answer you.'
MATSUOKA: 'I hate, as you know, to use diplomatic or suggestive terms and I may express my thought freely. Japan is intending to establish a new order of Greater East Asia, as made already public by the Japanese Government, in a circle of Japan, Manchoukuo and China including the South Seas, and wishes the liberation and freedom of all nations and races in the sphere, and thus is planning to increase their mutual and common profit aiming at co-prosperity. Speaking in the other way, I oppose subjugation and exploitation. I object to them even if made by Japan. Of course, some Japanese may be planning to subjugate and exploit these regions, but they are taught to do so by some Europeans and Americans, and so, they are those influenced by America and Europe. I oppose absolutely these means whether they might be done by Japanese or European and American powers. I have determined to resist and dispute if Japan would dareto commit such deeds. There are fairly many Japanese who have the same opinion as mine, that is, to wish all the people to get mutual and common advantages and to attain mutual prosperity. Japan does not refuse to have these regions entered by Europeans and Americans, nor will expel them from the sphere. I believe this very principle will bring immediately a large profit to Americans and Europeans too. You may have some doubt in what I said, surveying the present China Incident superficially, but if enough time is given, Japan will realize surely this idea as well in China.
'Now, as I believe, Japan can manage by herself in what concerns China, and I didn't question Germany about it. But I would like to know what attitude Germany will assume towards the aforecited Japanese ideal or course on the South Seas? What will Germany want to gain in the South Seas? And what does Germany want and what can it do as regards Russo-Japanese relations? As for the American-Japanese relations, I always think the future world civilization will belong to the Pacific civilization in which, I believe, both Japan and America will play great roles, and so the relation between both countries is an important matter affecting a serious influence on tomorrow's human beings. I wish to know what Germanywishes to do toward what she can do and what she requests of America or Japan from this overall viewpoint. But, excepting this for the present, as it is a too large and too distant a problem I want to know what Germany wishes to do towards America and what she can do for the sake of Japan in the present situation in the relation between Japan and America which you well know.'
OTT: 'It is quite natural of your opinion, but I want to know, first of all, of your meaning of the bounds of the South Seas.'
MATSUOKA:'In my personal opinion, I include as far as Siam for the present in the sphere, but it may be extended by and by in the future according to any change of circumstances.
OTT: 'This is my personal opinion too. As to the South Seas, Germany has three big viewpoints. Germany is now in the war against Great Britain, but there is a possibility of developing into a war against whole British Empire (war of destroying the British Empire) in the future. The South Seas, for Germany, must be seen from this point of view. This is (1) Germany must consider what should be done for her, with the South Seas, when the war develops to such conditions, (2) just whatthings and how much should be necessary to be required, (3) after all, the problem depends upon the German attitude of how to settle and how to keep her with Japan and the South Seas. Looking from such a broad standpoint at the war against Britain, the China Incident is simply an incident, isn't it? And I think, too, apart from this worldwide confusion and movement, the China Incident cannot be solved. Don't you think so?'
MATSUOKA:'I think I can agree with the last part of your personal opinions, and once sent a discourse of that fact to a magazine. At present, as you know, most of our people regard the China Incident as one of the most urgent matters to be settled. I, as Foreign Minister, cannot help considering the opinion of our people. The China Incident forms a part of the world-wide confusion indeed. However, it is the grave question for Japan to dispose of.'
OTT: 'How does Japan intend to settle China?'
MATSUOKA:'To knock CHIANG KAI-SHEK down completely is intended.'
(The Ambassador seemed a little startled.)
OTT:'It must be a means; but are there not any possibilities of consulting with CHIANG? I think it is a wise means to consult with him.'
MATSUOKA: 'I do not entirely refuse to confer with CHIANG, but there is no other means than to knock him down because of the Japanese characteristicviewpoint. I think, at present, he has to be subjugated thoroughly. Of course, means of arms is not the only one. At any rate, however, I believe that Japan, by her power alone, is able to settle the China Incident.'
I offer in evidence three documents for the purpose of showing strong action on the part of the Japanese government officials in promoting Japanese-German coalition and in making preparations for the execution of their plans for expansion. The first is prosecution document 4028-G.
The last document, the document mentioned, 4028-G, is admitted on the usual terns.
Prosecution's document No. 4028-G will receive exhibit No. 546.
TOKYO: 31 July 1940.
According to reliable information, the Japanese action against the British Spy Service, organized all over the land, was carried out at the demand of the new War Minister, Tojo. The War Minister is hereby pursuing two aims.
1. Acute aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, to drive them as much as possible to a breaking point and to hasten the action against British possessions in East Asia desired by the Army.
2. A blow against the influential pro-British groups-viz court and economic circles - which, impressedby the energetic action, will be dissuaded from further pro-British activity. OTT.
The second is prosecution document 4029-E. It is a telegram from the German ambassador in Tokyo to the German Foreign Minister.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4029-E will receive exhibit No. 547.
The three Japanese demands referred to in this telegram, as well as those shown in the next phase of this case, are related to demands of the French government for allowance of Japanese forces to be sent for operations against China, to pass through the Tonkin province and to recognize the use of airfields in that province by the Japanese, and to furnish facilities for transporting arms and ammunition.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document -- That has been admitted, has it not?
547, yes.
What is the purpose of separating this from the other matter you just described?
All three of these telegrams relate to the same subject matter. This is the third of the group.
This is a reference to the three Japanese demands. Why not tender the document showing those, if you have one, now?
I have a document, 985, which shows the three demands. The letter containing it is one of a group of letters in a document to be presented in the next phase of the case -- a rather extensive document. I do not object, of course, to present it here, if the Tribunal sees fit.
Your explanation is sufficient for the time being.
Telegram
23 August 1940 --
Will you strike that.
Telegram
Tokyo, 15 August 1940
URGENT!
The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:
The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the threeJapanese demands regarding Indo-China to the attitude that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renouncement of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted based on the demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (1 group garbled) Ministry Director promised, but it was pointed out that with reference to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 that our influence on French policy is limited.
(Signed) OTT.
I now offer in evidence prosecution document 4029-F.
Admitted on the usual terms.
Prosecution's document No. 4029-F will receive exhibit No. 548.
Telegram
Tokyo 23 August 1940
1. The Government announces an extensive revirement of the Foreign Service. Recalled are the Ambassador of the U.S., Ambassadors at France, Turkey, Brazil and also nineteen ministers, among them representatives in Hungary, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Argentina, Egypt, Canada, besides them five embassy councillors among them the councillers from England and Russia and finally eleven Consul Generals, among them the Consuls from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, Hamburg, and Prague. The Foreign Minister declared to the press, that this action had become necessary in order to secure the new foreign policy introduced by him and to bring the Japanese Foreign Service into coordination with the new Japanese conditions. For this reason it is also necessary to replace most of the division heads of the Foreign Ministry with new personalities. Publication of these changes will soon take place. The whole press of today is governed by this radical and, in Japanese history, unique revirement, which is called a 'coup d'Etat' in several papers. The drastic action of the government evidently intends in the first place to render harmless the exponents of pro-Anglo-Saxon courses. This is alsostrongly underlined by the press. Only a few of the recalled officials will be used in other posts.
2. With the aim of further preparation of suitable actions for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in thecommission. The commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers which is constantly demanded by this movement.
3. Both the diplomatic adjustment and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the government to follow a new course.
OTT.
I will now read from prosecution document 2137-D, in evidence as 541. Beginning on page 7: --
That is a lengthy document, Mr. Tavenner, so we will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning.
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